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BANKRUPTCY COURT JURISDICTION OVER TRIBAL
CREDITORS: LOWER BRULE CONSTRUCTION CO. V.
SHEESLEY'S PLUMBING & HEATING CO.
Sean R. McFarland*
Introduction
As Indian tribes have pursued a goal of economic development
and self-determination, engaging in commercial transactions with
non-Indians has become a necessity. Because these transactions
between tribe and non-Indian nearly always occur on tribal land,
they present special legal questions. One such question is the
status of the tribe in the event the non-Indian declares bank-
ruptcy, and whether in such event the bankruptcy court has
jurisdiction over a tribe which is a creditor in the bankruptcy
proceeding. Congress has the power to enact "uniform laws on
the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States".' A
conflict has emerged between Congress' manifestation of this
power in the Bankruptcy Code2 and tribal sovereignty. This
article will explore the manner and varying circumstances in
which courts have resolved this conflict and whether the manner
of resolution was correct in each case. It will also examine
whether there is an alternative argument to sovereign immunity
available to a tribal creditor to extricate itself from bankruptcy
court jurisdiction, and under what circumstances that argument
should succeed.
Sovereign Immunity and the Tribal Individual
The earliest case in this area, which dealt indirectly with the
issue of bankruptcy court jurisdiction over tribal creditors, was
In re Colgrove.3 There, plaintiffs-debtors contracted with the
Hoopa Timber Corporation, a subsidiary entity of the Hoopa
Valley Indian Tribe, to engage in logging operations on tribal
lands. In their complaint commencing an adversary proceeding
* B.A., 1986, J.D., 1989, University of Oklahoma. Assistant Managing Editor,
1988-89 American Indian Law Review staff. Now in private practice in Oklahoma City,
Okla.
1. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
3. 9 Bankr. 337 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1981).
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in bankruptcy, 4 the debtors alleged that the Timber Corporation
had breached the contract and that such breach was responsible
for the debtors filing for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.5 The question was whether the tribe's sovereign
immunity extended to its subsidiary, the Hoopa Timber Cor-
poration.6 Resolution of this issue depended upon the court's
interpretation of the charter of the Timber Corporation. The
original version of the "purposes and powers" paragraph of the
charter read, "The purpose for which this corporation is formed
is to engage in any commercial ... enterprise, having as its
object the development of natural resources of the tribe. .... -7
As amended two years later, the charter read, "The purpose for
which the corporation is formed is to engage in [any] commercial
... enterprise having as its objective the development and dis-
position of assets of the corporation which [it] has ac-
quired ... ."8
The court reasoned that because of the alteration of the
'purpose and powers" paragraph of the Timber Corporation
charter, the Timber Corporation was no longer "a corporation
subordinate to the tribe dealing in tribal property," but had
been transformed into "an entity which is now dealing in its
own acquired assets.-"9 It was argued that because the Timber
Corporation was dealing in timber, a tribal asset, during the
course of transactions with the debtors it was acting as a sub-
sidiary of the tribe. However, the court observed that the tribe
had sold the timber in question to the Timber Corporation. 0
Thus, the Timber Corporation was functionally as well as the-
oretically dealing in its own assets at the time of the alleged
breach. The court held that it had jurisdiction to proceed with
the case." Had the tribe not amended the Timber Corporation
charter, that entity would have been able to interpose the tribe's
sovereign immunity as a defense to jurisdiction, under the court's
reasoning.
4. An adversary proceeding is "a proceeding ... to recover money or prop-
erty .... "' BANKR. R. 7001. An adversary proceeding is commenced pursuant to FED.
R. Cirv. P. 3, BANxR. R. 7003.
5. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104-1174 (1982).
6. Colgrove, 9 Bankr. at 338.
7. Id. (quoting the charter of the Hoopa Timber Corporation, effective Nov. 11,
1976).




11. Id. at 339.
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From Colgrove it may be concluded that when a tribe creates
a business entity and grants it the power to deal in its own
assets rather than those of the tribe, the tribe has evinced an
intent that the entity operate independently of the tribe. The
entity may not then claim the protection of the tribe's sovereign
immunity. This result is sound. When a tribal entity acts in the
much freer capacity of an individual, rather than the capacity
of a tribe, that entity should be treated as an individual and
not an Indian tribe.'2 The result otherwise would be to grant it
the benefits of the status of an individual without the corre-
sponding downside risks.
Imaplicit Divestitture of Sovereign I6mmunity
Even if the Hoopa Valley Indian Tribe in Colgrove had
maintained the requisite amount of control over its subsidiary,
it is doubtful that the result would have been different. In re
Sandmar Corp.'3 held that the Bankruptcy Code applied to
Indian tribes and that a bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to
determine all bankruptcy issues between a tribal creditor and a
non-Indian debtor. In Sandmar, a New Mexico corporation
leased improvements on land within the Navajo Reservation
from the Navajo Tribe. Sandmar Corporation entered into pos-
session of the property in September of 1975 but failed to keep
current its lease obligations with the tribe. A notice demanding
cure of the lease and threatening termination was sent to Sand-
mar on December 30, 1980. On January 8, 1981, Sandmar filed
a petition in Chapter 11 with the bankruptcy court. Because of
rumors among tribe members that Sandmar had filed a Chapter
11 petition, the Advisory Committee of the Navajo Tribal Coun-
cil met on January 14 to discuss whether the bankruptcy court
would have jurisdiction over the tribe should it violate the
automatic stay.' 4 Late in the evening of January 19, the tribe's
staff attorney and ten or twelve others, including armed Navajo
Tribal Police, arrived at the premises of the debtor and physi-
cally took possession of the premises and all assets of the
debtor.'5
12. Accord Choteau v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 691 (1931) (individual income of tribal
member is subject to federal income taxation); see also Federal Power Comm'n v.
Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960).
13. 12 Bankr. 910 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981).
14. See II U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982).
15. when tribal officials took possession of the debtor's premises and personal
property, they performed an "act to obtain possession of property of the (bankruptcy
estate]," violating the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).
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Pointing out that the leased premises and personal property
seized by the tribe were the sole assets of the debtor, and that
such assets were necessary to the development of an effective
plan of reorganization under Chapter 11, the court took up the
issue of whether it had jurisdiction over the Navajo Tribe in
light of the tribe's retained sovereign immunity.' 6 The court
noted that, in general, Indian tribes were recognized as possess-
ing the common law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed
by sovereign powers, and that without Congressional authori-
zation Indian tribes were exempt from suit. 17 Under this analysis
the bankruptcy court could not have had jurisdiction over the
Navajo Tribe in light of the tribe's sovereign immunity. The
Bankruptcy Code defines "creditor" in broad terms as an "en-
tity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time
of or before [the filing of the petition].' 8 Because this definition
contains no reference to Indian tribes, it is arguable that Con-
gress did not intend that Indian tribes be considered "creditors"
under the Bankruptcy Code.
The court was forced to assert jurisdiction on grounds other
than express statutory authorization. It stated that while Indian
tribes still possessed those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn
by treaty or statute, a tribe's sovereign immunity might be
withdrawn by implication as a necessary result of its dependent
status. 19 For this proposition the court cited Oliphant v. Suqua-
mish Indian Tribe and United States v. Wheeler.2' Both of
these decisions involved tribal prosecution of non-Indians for
16. Sandmar, 12 Bankr. at 912.
17. Id. at 913 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978)); accord
Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Washington Dep't
of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977). Martinez involved an action for declaratory relief brought
by a female member of the Santa Clara Pueblo against a tribal ordinance denying tribal
membership to the children of female members of the tribe who married outside the
tribe but not to similarly situated children of male members of the tribe, under the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1982). In reversing the Court
of Appeals, the Supreme Court reasoned that because nothing in the provisions of the
Act purported to subject Indian tribes to federal jurisdiction in civil actions for declar-
atory relief, the Act contained no waiver of sovereign immunity. Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978).
Both Choteau v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 691 (1931), and Federal Power Comm'n v.
Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960), involved statutes expressly providing for
federal jurisdiction over Indian tribes in circumstances limited to the coverage of those
statutes.
18. 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
19. Sandmar, 12 Bankr. at 913.
20. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
21. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
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misdemeanors committed on tribal lands. Setting out what may
be called the doctrine of "implicit divestiture," the Court in
Wheeler reasoned that because tribes had been implicitly divested
of sovereignty in matters such as alienation of land and ability
to enter into relations with foreign governments, it was not
incongruous to limit tribes' ability to prosecute nontribal indi-
viduals for crimes committed on tribal lands.2 The reason given
for this extension was that tribal jurisdiction should not extend
to matters purely external to the tribe or beyond what was
necessary to protect tribal self-government or control over in-
ternal relations.2 Another reason behind the extension of "im-
plicit divestiture" was announced in Oliphant. There it was
reasoned that the United States, as the overriding sovereign in
relation to the Indian tribes, had manifested an intent that its
citizens be protected from "unwarranted intrusions" upon their
personal liberty. Because the power to prosecute and punish
individuals represents an important intrusion upon personal lib-
erty, tribes were deemed to have given up such power by virtue
of their dependent status.24
Based upon these underlying policy considerations, the rule
announced in Oliphant and Wheeler has been extended beyond
the criminal and into the civil context. Those cases have been
limited to situations of tort liability2 and violation of a civil
statute.2 In no case has "implicit divestiture" been extended to
situations involving consensual, commercial transactions. Rea-
soning by negative implication, the bankruptcy court in Sandmar
stated that "it has never been held that a consensual relationship
with an Indian or a tribe will subject a non-Indian to civil
liability in a tribal court." 27 The court reasoned that liability
arising out of commercial transactions should be treated no
differently from liability in tort. In doing so the court ignored
22. Id. at 326.
23. Id. Accord Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
24. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194 n.3.
25. U.N.C. Resources, Inc. v. Benaliy, 514 F. Supp. 358 (D.N.M. 1981) (injunctive
relief against assertion of tribal court jurisdiction over tort claim against uranium
processor for injury occurring on tribal land is proper inasmuch as tribal court juris-
diction would result in application of tribal standards of behavior off the reservation).
26. Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapaho & Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d 682 (10th
Cir. 1980) (district court had jurisdiction over action brought under the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1982) arising on land within the territorial
boundaries of the reservation but owned in fee by non-Indians).
27. Sandmar, 12 Bankr. at 914; Benally, 514 F. Supp. at 363.
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the rule in Williams v. Lee2l that a non-Indian who knowingly
deals with an Indian tribe is held to have implicitly consented
to tribal court jurisdiction. Because Sandmar entered into a
consensual transaction with the Navajo Tribe when it leased
improvements on tribal land, it consented to tribal court juris-
diction over any claim against it arising out of its lease agree-
ment.
However, the bankruptcy court advanced a more compelling
argument than extension of "implicit divestiture." It pointed
out that had Sandmar somehow consented to tribal court juris-
diction, that jurisdiction could not be exercised because the tribe
had no body of bankruptcy law. The court believed that this
would result in an unfair adjudication of the rights of the parties
involved, and concluded that there was no legal basis upon
which to rest tribal court jurisdiction over the matter.29
It should be noted at this point that this last argument
advanced by the bankruptcy court is compelling only on the
facts of Sandmar. As the bankruptcy court observed, the lease-
hold and personal property seized by the tribe comprised the
sole assets of the bankruptcy estate and so were vital to an
effective reorganization plan. Because those assets would be in
the hands of the tribe at the time of any tribal court action, it
is possible to understand how such tribal court action might
bring about an unfair adjudication of the rights of all parties
to the bankruptcy proceeding. Furthermore, the federal policies
favoring comprehensive determination of creditors' rights and
equitable treatment of all parties to the bankruptcy proceeding
would be violated. These larger policy considerations are what
drove the court to its result in Sandmar. As the court noted,
the Bankruptcy Code embodies the totality of bankruptcy law
in the United States,30 as enacted by Congress pursuant to its
powers under the Constitution.31 The federal policies discussed
above thus supersede any federal policy favoring tribal self-
determination, and jurisdiction over the bankruptcy proceeding
itself must be vested in the bankruptcy court.32 Moreover, when
one considers the procedural difficulties a tribal court would
encounter in its attempt to administer a Chapter 11 case, the
28. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
29. Sandmar, 12 Bankr. at 915.
30. Id.
31. See supra note 1.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1982). Sandmar was decided prior to the 1984 amendments
to the Bankruptcy Code. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157, 1334 (Supp. II 1984).
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practicality of tribal court jurisdiction over a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding is indeed called into question. The result in Sandmar is
therefore sound. However, it is not certain whether the same
result should entail in a case involving a dispute which is less
inclusive of the entire bankruptcy proceeding.
Sandmar has been followed in one case. In re Shape33 involved
a "lease and option to purchase" of land situated on the Fort
Belknap Indian Reservation. When defendants-lessees filed for
relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, plaintiffs-
lessors brought an action for relief from the automatic stay.3
The court dealt with two issues. First, did it have jurisdiction
over Indian trust lands constituting part of the bankruptcy
estate? Second, was the agreement involved a valid "lease-
option" so as to constitute a part of the bankruptcy estate?
35
Citing Sandmar as directly controlling, the court found that it
had jurisdiction.3 6 It dealt with the second issue quite differently.
The court noted that the lands subject to the "lease-option"
were restricted, allotted Indian lands located on the Fort Belknap
Indian Reservation and were held in trust for the benefit of the
plaintiffs, members of the Gros Ventre Tribe.37 By act of Con-
gress,318 the approval of the Secretary of the Interior was specif-
ically required before there could be an alienation of restricted
Indian allotments. Because no such approval had been sought,
the court concluded that plaintiffs could not have transferred
the land on their own. The most that passed to the bankruptcy
estate was the debtors' interest in a void contract.3 9
Shape might be viewed as creating an exception to the Sand-
mar rule in cases involving a "lease-option" of Indian trust
lands. If it does represent such an exception it is certainly de
minimus. In order to escape the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court it would be necessary for a tribal creditor to enter into a
lease agreement which would be declared void. This is presum-
ably just the opposite result desired by a creditor such as the
one in Shape, who seeks relief from the automatic stay. The
rule of Sandmar that a tribal creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding
33. 25 Bankr. 356 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1982).
34. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982).
35. Shape, 25 Bankr. at 358.
36. Id. at 358-59.
37. Id. at 359. Because no "patent in fee" had been issued to plaintiffs, Colgrove
was not controlling.
38. 25 U.S.C. § 392 (1982).
39. Shape, 25 Bankr. at 360.
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may not interpose tribal sovereign immunity as a defense to
bankruptcy court jurisdiction is thus firmly established.
Lower BI/We Co) ut. Co.
v. Sheesleys' Plumbing & Heaig Co.
A situation in which the rationale of Sandmar should not
apply was presented in Lower Brule Construction Co. v. Shees-
ley's Plumbing & Heating Co.40 The Lower Brule Construction
Company entered into a construction contract with the Standing
Rock Housing Authority for the renovation of a housing project
on the Rock Sioux Indian Reservation. To guarantee Lower
Brule's performance under the contract, an irrevocable standby
letter of credit was procured from Tri-County State Bank with
the Housing Authority as beneficiary. Following commencement
of construction the Housing Authority notified Lower Brule of
a material default on the construction contract and made a
demand on the bank for payment under the letter of credit. The
bank had received an earlier demand for payment from Shees-
ley's, a subcontractor claiming to be a third party beneficiary
under the letter of credit. The bank responded to these demands
by filing an action for declaratory relief in state court. Following
commencement of the state court action, Lower Brule filed for
relief under Chapter 11.
Four days later the Housing Authority filed an action in
federal district court against the bank alleging wrongful dishonor
of the letter of credit. Lower Brule then commenced an adversary
proceeding in the bankruptcy court to enjoin payment under the
letter of credit.41 The Housing Authority then filed a petition in
district court to remove the state court action. Following a
hearing on Lower Brule's application for a preliminary injunc-
tion, the bankruptcy court ordered that each of the actions in
the district court be enjoined from further proceedings, and
enjoined payment under the letter of credit. The adversary
proceeding was remanded to district court. The bankruptcy court
had determined that it was precluded from hearing the adversary
proceeding because the action was not a "core proceeding. ' 42
40. 84 Bankr. 638 (D.S.D. 1988).
41. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1982) states that "the [bankruptcy court] may Issue any
order, process, or judgment that is necessary .. to carry out the provisions of this
title."
42. 11 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. II 1984) provides that "[b]ankruptcy
judges may hear and determine all ... core proceedings .... " In general, state law
claims, such as an action to enjoin payment under a letter of credit, are not "core"
proceedings.
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However, the district court held on remand that the bank-
ruptcy court was not precluded from hearing the adversary
proceeding unless another court had exclusive jurisdiction.43 The
Housing Authority argued that the bankruptcy court lacked
jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding because exclusive ju-
risdiction over the matter resided in tribal court.
Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies
The Housing Authority invoked the "exhaustion rule," which
states that in a dispute between a tribe and a non-Indian, the
issue of jurisdiction must be decided in the first instance by the
tribal court, and cited Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. La Plante.4
La Plante involved a dispute over an insurer's duty to insure
members of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe against liability in tort
arising out of an accident which occurred on the Blackfeet
Reservation. The insurer alleged federal district court jurisdiction
under diversity of citizenship. The Supreme Court approved the
principle of National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow
Tribe'"-that the question of jurisdiction in such cases must be
decided in the first instance by the tribal court. In articulating
the "exhaustion rule" the Court indicated that deference to
tribal courts was a matter of comity and was analogous to
abstention. It stated that "even where there is concurrent juris-
diction.., deference to state proceedings renders it appropriate
for federal courts to decline jurisdiction in certain circum-
stances." 46 Such circumstances would include any in which a
strong federal policy favors resolution in a nonfederal forum.
In any case where exhaustion of tribal court remedies would be
proper, unconditional federal court jurisdiction would infringe
on tribal court authority, thereby impairing tribal government
authority over tribal matters. Thus, the strong federal policy of
promoting tribal self-government would be frustrated.
The court in Lower Brule did not correctly deal with the issue
before it. Despite the fact that several lower federal courts had
followed the "exhaustion rule," 47 the court in Lower Brule
phrased the issue before it as "[w]hether the exhaustion require-
ment ... is applicable to an action for relief filed in a bank-
ruptcy court." 48 With only passing attention to La Plante and
43. Lower Brute, 84 Bankr. at 640.
44. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
45. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
46. La Plante, 480 U.S. at 16, n.8.
47. Lower Brute, 84 Bankr. at 641.
48. Id.
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Crow Tribe, the court followed the incongruous rule of Sandmar
and held that the "exhaustion rule" did not apply in bankruptcy
proceedings. 49 In its oversimplification of the jurisdictional issue,
the Lower Brule court forgot that the case before it was an
adversary proceeding and not the bankruptcy proceeding itself.
As mentioned earlier,50 an adversary proceeding is much nar-
rower in scope than the bankruptcy proceeding of which it is a
part. Because it often resembles a state court action, an adver-
sary proceeding raises the same considerations of comity and
deference to nonfederal tribunals raised in La Plante and Crow
Tribe.51 If an adversary proceeding finds its way into federal
district court, the statutory and judge-made rules which govern
jurisdiction there must apply to the adversary proceeding. The
adversary proceeding in Lower Brule presented a clear case for
application of the "exhaustion rule." If one examines the in-
stances in which federal courts have been willing to recognize
the "exhaustion rule," this conclusion is obvious. Those in-
stances included breach of contract claims,52 a trespass action, 3
an action to collect on a promissory note, 4 and a mortgage
foreclosure action.55 Each of these, with the exception of the
trespass action, involved disputes arising out of consensual,
commercial transactions with Indian tribes. The dispute in Lower
Brule over the right to payment under a letter of credit is
indistinguishable. In each of these cases the strong federal pol-
icies of tribal self-government and self-determination, repre-
sented by comity and deference to tribal authority, outweighed
any policy favoring federal jurisdiction.
The La Plante and Crow Tribe opinions also noted possible
exceptions to the "exhaustion rule." The Court in either case
stated that exhaustion of tribal court remedies is not required
where "motivated by a desire to harass ... conducted in bad
faith ... patently violative of jurisdictional prohibitions, or
49. Id.
50. See supra note 4.
51. An adversary proceeding may be commenced in the district court in which the
bankruptcy proceeding is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (1982). While commenced in the
bankruptcy court, the adversary proceeding in Lower Brule was remanded to the district
court.
52. Brown v. Washoe Hous. Auth., 835 F.2d 1327 (10th Cir. 1988); Wellman v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 815 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1987).
53. United States v. Turtle Mountain Hous. Auth., 816 F.2d 1273 (8th Cir. 1987).
54. Palmer v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 15 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training
Program) 3001 (D.S.D. 1987).
55. Fed. Land Bank of Omaha v. Reeves, 14 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law.
Training Program) 3071 (D.S.D. 1987).
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where... futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity
to challenge the court's jurisdiction. ' 56 Nothing in the facts of
Lower Brule indicated bad faith or a desire to harass, and there
were no express prohibitions on tribal court jurisdiction.5 7 Be-
cause of the broad civil jurisdiction of the Standing Rock Sioux
tribal courts, there could be no lack of an adequate opportunity
to challenge such jurisdiction.5 8 Lower Brule thus did not fit
into any of the exceptions to the "exhaustion rule."
Mandatory Abstention: Section 1334(c)(2)
Additionally, the court in Lower Brule did not pay attention
to the jurisdictional provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The
abstention provisions of the 1984 Amendments provide that
"[u]pon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon
a state law claim . . . related to ... but not arising under [the
Bankruptcy Code] ... the district court shall abstain from
hearing such proceeding ... ."59 Lower Brule's claim to pro-
ceeds of the letter of credit was certainly "based on a state law
claim." Because this claim arose out of the agreement of the
parties to the construction contract and not a provision of the
Bankiuptcy Code, it was a "related to" rather than an "arising
under" action. Had the Housing Authority filed in a timely
fashion a motion to abstain, the district court would have been
required to abstain from hearing the action. The tribal court
would have then have had jurisdiction over the matter.
Misplaced Reliance on the Sovereign Immunity Cases
Another fault in the reasoning of Lower Brule was its express
reliance on the sovereign immunity cases, discussed above. The
court cited Oliphant for its holding that there existed inherent
limits on tribal sovereignty. It stated that "protection of non-
Indian debtors by operation of the automatic stay ... [limits]
the sovereignty of Indian tribes to assert jurisdiction over bank-
ruptcy proceedings. "60 Observing that the Standing Rock Sioux
Code of Justice made no reference to bankruptcy jurisdiction,
the court reasoned that to grant the tribe jurisdiction over the
bankruptcy proceeding would represent an "unwarranted intru-
56. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. at 856 n.21 (quoting in part Judice v. Vail, 430 U.S.
327, 338 (1977)).
57. See infra note 59.
58. See infra note 62.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
60. Lower Brute, 84 Bankr. at 642.
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sion" upon the personal liberty of a United States citizen, thus
bringing the case before it into the realm of Oliphant.61 Again,
the court in Lower Brule was incorrect. The fact that the tribal
code made no reference to bankruptcy jurisdiction was irrele-
vant. The case before it was an adversary proceeding and not
the bankruptcy proceeding itself. Thus the federal policy favor-
ing uniform bankruptcy laws could not outweigh the federal
policy favoring tribal self-government and self-determination.
The tribal code did provide that tribal courts "shall have civil
jurisdiction over any matter where one party shall be an Indian
... and ... [t]he transaction occurs on [tribal lands]." 62 For
precisely the same reason the Lower Brule court should have
dealt more adequately with the "exhaustion rule" argument, it
mistakenly relied on the reasoning of the sovereign immunity
cases.
Conclusion
The following conclusions may be drawn concerning bank-
ruptcy court jurisdiction over tribal creditors. First, when a tribe
creates a subsidiary business entity and empowers it to deal in
its own assets, the tribe has evinced an intent that the entity
operate independently of the tribe. The entity then may not
claim protection of its creator's sovereign immunity. The entity
must expect to be subject to bankruptcy court jurisdiction as
would any non-Indian business entity. This result is sound. By
being empowered to deal in its own assets, the entity enjoys
greater freedom to act in the marketplace than if it could deal
only in restricted tribal assets. It must be subject to the same
downside risks, such as finding itself a creditor in a bankruptcy
proceeding, as any non-Indian business entity. Second, an Indian
tribe which is a creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding cannot
claim the protection of its own retained sovereign immunity.
The broad federal policy of uniformity of bankruptcy laws
outweighs the policy of tribal self-government and self-deter-
mination.
A different result should entail in a case involving an adver-
sary proceeding, which is necessarily narrower in scope than an
entire bankruptcy proceeding. In an adversary proceeding the
federal policy favoring uniform national bankruptcy laws is not
present. Therefore, the policy favoring tribal self-government
61. See supra note 20.
62. STANDING RocK Sioux TRIBE CODE O1 JUSTICE § 1-107(b) (rev. 1982).
320
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and self-determination must take precedence. Non-Indian parties
must be subject to court-made doctrines such as the "exhaustion
rule" and statutory 'provisions mandating abstention. In an
adversary proceeding which is subject to either of these rules,
the tribal court must have jurisdiction. This places no greater
burden on the non-Indian party than would be placed on it were
the action not related to a bankruptcy proceeding. It makes no
commercial sense for a court to grant a party to a transaction
such an unbargained-for benefit.
Each of the principal cases discussed above involved consen-
sual, commercial transactions between tribes and non-Indians.
For a court to seize jurisdiction, absent an overriding policy
such as that manifested in the Bankruptcy Code, flies in the
face of commercial reality. As stated in Palmer v. Yankton
Sioux Tribe,63 "Itihe rules giving Indian tribes sovereign im-
munity have been in existence for a long time, and persons
doing business with Indian tribes either have been or should be
aware of the doctrine." 64 Only when such rules are followed
will the goal of tribal self-government and economic self-deter-
mination be served.
63. Palmer v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 15 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training
Program) 3001 (D.S.D. 1987).
64. Id.
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